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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact that would preclude the enforcement of the artificial insemination contract 
requiring the Appellant be legally responsible for any child born as a result of the 
application of the artificial insemination procedure on the Appellee when the Appellant is 
not the biological father of the child. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Furthermore, since summary judgment is a question of law, the appellate court is 
free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. K & T, Inc. v. Doroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 
626-27 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE: Did the Trial Court err in not applying the doctrines of estoppel, res judicata, 
and waiver. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Furthermore, since summary judgment is a question of law, the appellate court is 
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free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. K & T, Inc. v. Doroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 
626-27 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on the 31st day of March, 1979. The Appellee gave birth 
to two children, Stephanie Krambule, born on January 20, 1985 and Matthew Krambule, 
born on March 24, 1992. The parties entered into a stipulation and property settlement 
agreement on the 16th day of January, 1992. The Appellant appeared in court on the 10th day 
of February, 1992 and presented testimony concerning jurisdiction and grounds and 
introduced the stipulation and agreement. The divorce decree was signed by the judge on 
the 3rd day of April, 1992 and entered with the clerk of the court on the 6th day of April, 
1992. The Appellee filed a verified petition on July 15, 1996 in which the Appellee 
requested the court to make a determination as to the Appellant' s responsibility for the minor 
child Matthew Krambule. 
The trial court invited the parties to submit motions for summary judgment on the 
paternity issue. The motions were heard on the 21st day of January, 1998 and the judge 
issued a bench ruling. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order on motion for 
summary judgment were signed by the judge on March 24, 1998 and filed with the clerk of 
the court on March 27, 1998. An evidentiary hearing was concerning the financial aspects 
of the court's ruling was held on the 30th day of April, 1998. This hearing resulted in 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a modified divorce decree, which were entered with 
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the clerk of the court on the 9th day of July, 1998. The Appellant filed an appeal to this court 
on or about the 8th day of September, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on March 31, 1979. The parties had two children, 
Stephanie, bom January 29,1985, and Matthew, bom March 24,1992. Both children were 
conceived through artificial insemination. The facts surrounding the second child are at 
issue in this case. The parties have separated twice since their marriage. Once in late 1989 
and again on or about May 2, 1991. (Deposition of Barbra R. Krambule, hereinafter 
Krambule depo., pp. 9-11). On or about July 18, 1990, the parties agreed to again use 
artificial insemination to conceive a child. On that date the parties signed an agreement 
entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial 
Insemination of Donor Sperm". (Krambule depo., pp. 12-13). A copy of the Agreement is 
attached as Addendum 1. Beginning in August, 1990, and continuing thereafter until 
January 1991, Appellant underwent various medical procedures to prepare for the artificial 
insemination process which included two surgical procedures and the administration of 
medication preventing her menstrual periods. In approximately February, 1991, Appellant 
and Appellee picked three potential sperm donors. (Krambule depo., pp. 14-15). Beginning 
in February, 1991, and &continuing thereafter until Appellee conceived, she began 
undergoing blood tests, taking fertility drugs, having ultrasounds and undergoing the 
insemination process. (Krambule depo., pp. 17-18). 
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The parties separated on approximately May 2, 1991 and Appellee conceived on or 
about June 23,1991, approximately one month after the parties separated. (Krambule depo., 
pp. 18). During the month after separation the Appellee continued with the process because 
she believed that they would work things out as they had before in the previous separation. 
(Krambule depo., p21). In fact, during the Summer of 1991, the parties continued seeing 
each other socially. (Krambule depo., p47). After separating, Appellant wrote a letter to the 
Appellee which she received at the end of May, 1991 in an attempt to reconcile with the 
Appellee. (Krambule depo. p40-41). A copy of this letter and its typewritten equivalent was 
included as Deposition Exhibit 3 to the Appellee's deposition and is attached hereto as 
Addendum 2. After discussing the financial ramifications of divorce, the second to last 
paragraph of that letter states "And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how that's going to 
work." This letter admits that the Appellant knew Barbra Krambule was continuing the 
artificial insemination procedure and could still get pregnant. (Krambule depo., p43). 
Three months after conception, in approximately September, 1991, the Appellee then 
initiated divorce proceedings. In approximately November or December 1991, the 
Appellant's counsel prepared a stipulation and property settlement agreement. On 
December 3, 1991, Appellee's attorney sent a letter to Appellant's attorney stating that the 
Appellee wished to pursue child support for the child with which she was pregnant. This 
letter is identified as Deposition Exhibit 2 to the Appellee's deposition and a copy is 
attached hereto as Addendum 3. 
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Prior to the preparation and execution of the stipulation and agreement, the Appellee 
was admitted to St. Benedict's Hospital for emotional and mental problems resulting from 
verbal abuse and other conflicts arising between the parties during the marriage and was 
hospitalized for three weeks. (Krambule depo. p24). When Appellee signed the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement, she was still undergoing treatment at St. Benedict's. 
(Krambule depo., pp. 25-26). 
Matthew was born on March 24,1992, and the Divorce Decree was entered on April 
6, 1992. Appellee did not pursue paternity after Matthew was bom because the Appellant 
always promised to do what was right for Matthew in the future. (Krambule depo., p30). 
The Appellant continually led the Appellee to believe that he would assume responsibility 
for Matthew by telling the other minor child that he would start visiting with her and her 
brother when Matthew got older. (Krambule depo. p.28). Then he wanted to wait until a 
child psychologist determined what was best for Matthew. (Krambule depo. p28). When 
Appellee realized that the Appellant was never going to accept responsibility for Matthew, 
she initiated this proceeding. (Krambule depo., p30). 
At the request of the trial court, both parties submitted motions for summary 
judgment. The Appellee's motion was supported by the Appellee's deposition, which was 
published. The Appellant's motion was not supported by a deposition or by Affidavit. On 
January 21, 1998 a hearing on the summary judgments was held before Judge Darwin 
Hansen. That hearing resulted in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a order on motion 
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for summary judgment, which documents were filed with the clerk on March 27, 1998. 
(Copies of said documents are attached hereto as Addendums 4 and 5). After the Court's 
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, an evidentiary hearing relating to the financial 
obligations of the Appellant as the result of the summary judgment ruling was held before 
Judge Hansen on the 30th day of April, 1998. Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
modified decree of divorce was entered with the clerk of the court on July 9, 1998. 
The Appellant appealed from the trial court's order on the motions for summary 
judgment and from the evidentiary hearing held on April 30,1998. However, a review of 
the Appellant's brief on appeal will demonstrate that all of the issues raised in Points 1 
through 4 of the Appellant's brief deal with the trial court's determination that the Appellant 
was the father of the child, which determination was made as result of the motions for 
summary judgment. The Appellant in his brief under issues presented for review only 
addresses the issue of the determination of the Appellant as the father of the minor child 
Matthew and does not raise any issues concerning the financial obligations imposed upon 
the Appellant at the subsequent evidentiary hearing held on April 30,1998. The Appellant, 
however, attempts to use evidentiary findings made at the April 30, 1998 hearing to attack 
the trial court's decision on the motions for summary judgment, which motions were heard 
on January 21, 1998. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly ruled that the artificial insemination contract bound the 
Appellee to be legally responsible for the minor child born as a result of this procedure 
despite the fact that the parties were separated at the time of conception. The issues of intent, 
contract interpretation and bad faith were not preserved for appeal and no factual basis either 
by affidavit of deposition testimony was presented by the Appellant to support their 
application. Even if these issues were preserved, the clear and unambiguous language of the 
contract clearly shows that the Appellant had expressly given his consent to be bound by the 
artificial insemination contract and, therefore, the District Court did not need to consider 
extrinsic evidence for purposes of the partial summary judgment. ; ^ 
The issues of estoppel, res judicata and waiver are not preserved for appeal and no 
factual basis either by Affidavit or deposition testimony was presented by the Appellee at 
the hearing on the motions for summary judgment. The Appellant asserts these issues as a 
defense to the court's determination that the Appellant is the father of the minor child 
Matthew. Those do not preclude the trial court from determining that the Appellant was the 
natural father of the minor child, and furthermore, public policy concerns regarding the 
support of minor children preclude the application of legal and equitable defenses such as 
estoppel, res judicata and waiver to prevent the collection of on going child support for 
minor children, even those bom as a result of artificial insemination. 
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Appellee was awarded attorney's fees and costs at trial. If she prevails on this appeal, 




APPELLANT FAILED TO CREATE ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Rule 56(e) states: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trail. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e). 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that a party may not rely upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings to avoid summary judgment, but must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 
(Utah 1983); Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1979). 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by her deposition 
testimony and all facts cited by the Appellee were referenced to the appropriate portion of 
the deposition record. Appellant failed to introduce any testimony by affidavit or otherwise 
which contradicted the facts alleged by Appellee. The Appellant in his brief cites from the 
findings of fact entered by the court as a result of an evidentiary hearing held on April 30, 
1998. The trial court's ruling on the summary judgment was on or about the 21st day of 
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January, 1998. None of the evidence available to the court on April 30,1998 was available 
to the trial judge when he ruled on the summary judgment with the exception of the 
deposition of the Appellee. It is inappropriate for the Appellant to rely upon factual 
determinations made at a subsequent hearing as a basis for reversing a summary judgment 
issued by the trial court more than three months before. If the Appellant wanted to rely upon 
such information, it was the Appellant's obligation to have presented that information to the 
trial court at the time of the motion for summary judgment by Affidavit or otherwise. The 
Appellant failed to do so and cannot now attack the trial court's ruling on summary 
judgment by reference to that material. 
One of the most significant factual allegations that Appellant fails to dispute is his 
knowledge that the Appellant was continuing with the artificial insemination procedure after 
the parties separated in May, 1991. (Addendum 2). Appellee thought he did know because 
of the letter she received at the end of May, 1991 alluding to what will happen if she gets 
pregnant. Appellant attempts to create a material issue of this fact by denying his knowledge 
but fails to support his denial with any reference to any affidavit or sworn testimony that was 
before the trial judge when the motion was heard. 
Having failed to create a material issue of fact concerning his knowledge, the 
remainder of his appeal should be denied since he did have knowledge that Appellee was 
continuing with the procedure and took no steps to with draw his consent. 
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II. 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant takes his appeal from both the District grant of partial motion for summary 
judgment and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Modified Decree of Divorce 
arising from the trial. Appellant has failed to identify which of his Issues Presented arise 
from which of the prior proceedings. However, for those issues presented at trial, the 
Appellant has the burden of marshaling the evidence. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah 
App. 1994). If the facts are not marshaled, the Court "assumes that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court," Id, at 12 (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991). 
The District Court specifically limited its determination in the summary judgment 
by stating "The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment and 
will rule solely in [sic] the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the 
minor child in question". R. at 327. The Court went on to conclude that the Appellant was 
the legal father of the child because the artificial insemination contract was still in effect at 
the time the child was bom. 
Subsequently, Appellant raised several defenses to a determination of his financial 
responsibility as a result of the application of the contract. Among those issues raised at trial 
on April 30, 1998 were estoppel, res judicata and waiver. At trial, the Court partially 
accepted one of those defenses, estoppel, to preclude the Appellee from collecting any child 
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support accruing prior to the date the Petition to Modify was filed. Specific findings of fact 
were entered on the issue of estoppel. R. at 397-98. To the extent Appellant seeks to 
reverse the Trial Court's evidentiary hearing of April 30, 1998, Appellant is required to 
marshal the evidence as it relates to these issues. 
The Appellant has failed in his brief to demonstrate that any evidence was presented 
at the motion for summary judgment to counter the factual allegations made by the Appellee 
in her deposition. Consequently, the court should dismiss the Appellant's appeal as to the 
court's determination as a result of the motion for summary judgment. 
III. 
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT 
AGREEING TO ACCEPT ALL LEGAL 
AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHILDREN 
BORN AS A RESULT OF THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PROCEDURE. 
On or about July 18, 1990, Rick D. Krambule and Barbara Krambule signed a 
document entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial 
Insemination of Donor Semen", hereinafter "Agreement", Krambule depo. Exhibit 1. A 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 1. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement states: 
We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept the full 
legal, moral, parental, financial, social, emotional and cultural 
responsibility and care of any offspring that may result from any 
pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination 
procedure(s). We also mutually and individually agree to 
accept and assume the same duties, obligations and 
responsibilities toward such offspring to the full extent in the 
same manner as owed by the undersigned to naturally occurring 
offspring, and acknowledge and agree that any offspring 
-11-
resulting from the artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be 
their legal heir(s) and that the said offspring shall be, for all 
purposes, the child of the husband and wife, and the husband 
shall for all purposes be considered the father of the said 
offspring. 
We agree, individually and severally, that neither of them will 
at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in any way, any 
person, including any child or offspring in initiating or pursuing 
any claim or legal proceeding with respect to any matter arising 
out of, or resulting from the artificial insemination procedure(s) 
authorized herein. 
Agreement If 10 & 13. 
Appellant has not argued that he was under duress, incompetent, uninformed, or that 
there was a mistake, lack of consideration or the existence of fraud so as to call into question 
the validity of the contract. Rather, Appellant attacks the subsequent application of the 
contract to a child born after the separation of the parties. 
A child born in wedlock is presumed to be the parent's child. This presumption 
cannot be rebutted by the testimony of the parents. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 provides 
that: 
children born to the parties after the date of the marriage, shall 
be deemed the legitimate children of both the parties for all 
purposes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2) (emphasis added). 
While this presumption may be rebutted, it cannot be rebutted by the testimony of 
the child's parents. This is known as the "Lord Mansfield's rule". State in Interest of 
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J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). In that case the Supreme Court stated "spouses 
themselves may not give testimony which would tend to illegitimize the child". Id. at 713-
14. Furthermore, the party wishing to rebut this presumption must do so "beyond a 
reasonable doubt". Id. at 713. 
Therefore, the only way Appellant can disprove the paternity of this child is on the 
basis that the child is not genetically related to the father. However, as discussed below, 
equitable principals prevent him from using this evidence. 
Due to infertility problems, Appellant and Appellee sought to implement a procedure 
known as heterologous insemination or AID. This procedure involves artificial 
insemination using the sperm of a third person donor. In consultation with a doctor, the 
parties agreed to sign the agreement referred to above. That agreement precludes both parties 
from denying their responsibility for a child and from initiating any legal proceeding to 
invalidate their parental liability for a child born from the procedure. 
Equitable Estoppel has three elements: representation, reliance and detriment. This 
doctrine may only be used when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise perpetrate 
a fraud or unfair advantage. Masters v. Worslev. 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989). 
In the case at bar, Appellee has relied upon the representations made by the Appellant 
in the Agreement and particularly those made in paragraph 10. In reliance upon these 
representations, the Appellee consented to under go this lengthy and sometimes painful 
procedure in order to become pregnant. The procedure was successful, Appellee became 
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pregnant and now the Appellee has the responsibilities arising by virtue of being the natural 
mother to this child. Appellant should be prevented from taking advantage of the Appellee 
by shirking the financial responsibility he agreed to accept under the Agreement. 
IV. 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE INTENT OF PARTIES IN 
AGREEING TO THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION CONTRACT IS 
IRRELEVANT. 
(1) The issue of intent has not been preserved for appeal. 
In order for the Appellant to preserve a substantive issue for appeal, the Appellant 
must first raise the issue before the trial court. Hart v. Salt Lake County Com'n, 945 P.2d 
125,129 (Utah App. 1997). In order for the District Court to be given an opportunity to rule 
on the issue several steps must be taken. First, the issue must be timely raised. Second, the 
issue must be specifically raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court. Finally 
the party must introduce to the trial court supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to 
support its argument. Id, at 130 (citations omitted). 
In this matter, the Appellant has raised for the first time the argument that the Trial 
Court failed to consider the "parties intent of [sic] the artificial insemination contract and 
its interpretation" (Appellant's Brief p. 17). No mention of the intent of the parties nor the 
interpretation of the artificial insemination contract was made in Appellant's Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment nor was the issue raised at the hearing on the Motion on 
January 21,1998. In fact, as the Appellant notes "The trial court did not hear any evidence 
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as to the intent of the parties nor whether the contract is clear on its face." (Appellant's 
Brief p. 17). The reason there was no evidence of intent taken by the Court was because it 
was not raised as an issue either in the Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment or at trial. 
As a result, the District Court has not had an opportunity to consider or rule on the issues 
of intent and interpretation now raised in Appellant's argument and those issues should not 
now be considered on appeal. 
(2) Extrinsic evidence was not admissible to interpret the Artificial Insemination 
Contract. 
Even assuming the issues of intent and interpretation were preserved by the 
Appellant, the District Court properly granted summary judgment without resorting to 
extrinsic evidence. It is well settled that extrinsic evidence only becomes admissible if the 
terms of the contract are unclear or ambiguous. Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises. Inc., 968 P.2d 
861, 863 (Utah App. 1998). Furthermore, "when a contract is in writing and the language 
is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must also be determined from the words of the 
agreement and a contract interpreted without regard to extrinsic evidence is a question of 
law." R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1074 (Utah 1997). Thus, 
if the Trial Court did not conclude that the Agreement was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence 
is not admissible to interpret its meaning or the intent of the parties. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has found that ambiguity does not exist merely 
because a party can ascribe a contrary meaning or intent to a particular provision of the 
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contract. Rather, the opposing interpretation must be tenable. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held: 
a contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just because one 
party gives that provision a different meaning than another party 
does. To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the 
parties must each be tenable. 
Id (citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 
(Utah 1990). 
Appellant attempts to find ambiguity in the intent of the parties by relying upon 
paragraph 8 of the Agreement. (Appellant's Brief p. 18). Paragraph 8 states: "We 
acknowledge that our participation in the artificial insemination procedure(s) is voluntary." 
Appellant wishes to interpret this as requiring ongoing consent and, therefore, Appellee had 
a duty to inform the Appellant that she was continuing with the procedure after their 
separation. Neither the interpretation nor the conclusion drawn by Appellant therefrom are 
tenable. 
The only tenable reading of this language is that the signors of this document 
acknowledged that by signing the document that they have granted their consent to 
participate in the artificial insemination procedure. Under no possible reading of this 
language can it be claimed that it creates an affirmative duty on the part of the Appellee to 
obtain Mr. Krambule's consent before every test, treatment or examination. As testified to 
by Appellee in her deposition, the artificial insemination process began in August, 1990, 
approximately nine months before the parties separated. This process included two 
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surgeries, the taking of fertility drugs and a submission to a very involved process of testing 
Appellee's blood every three days and then every day during the course of a menstrual cycle 
to determine the best time to fertilize the eggs. This procedure went on for several months 
before the Appellee became pregnant. (Krambule depo. ppl4-17). 
Even if the Court were to interpret the Agreement as requiring Appellant's ongoing 
consent, the Appellee must take an affirmative step to revoke his consent, which he had 
previously given expressly in paragraph 8 of the Agreement. Appellant has failed to 
introduce any evidence that he had withdrawn or attempted to withdraw his consent at any 
time after the parties separation on May 2, 1991, and before conception in June, 1991. 
(Krambule depo. 18). The Appellant did not tell the Appellee to stop the artificial 
insemination procedure. (Krambule Depo, pp. 42-43). The Appellant, also after the parties 
separated, received bills from the continuing artificial insemination procedure. (Krambule 
depo., p. 45). 
The Appellant's action was reasonable given the history of the parties, including a 
previous separation and reconciliation, Appellant's desire to reconcile, the fact that no 
divorce proceedings had been initiated by the time of conception in June, 1991, and the 
extensive and costly procedure involved. (Krambule depo. pp. 40-41). In the May letter, 
(Addendum 2), the Appellant discussed the financial problems that would occur if they did 
not reconcile and Appellee did get pregnant. (Krambule depo. p43). The Appellant 
-17-
interpreted this to mean that the Appellee did know that she was continuing with the 
procedure. (Krambule depo. p43). 
Aside for the bare assertions in the Memorandum in Support of the Motion and those 
made in the Brief in support of this Appeal, the Appellant offered no evidence at the time 
of the motion for summary judgment countering the Appellant's version of events or 
interpretation of them as set forth in the Appellant's deposition and cited in the 
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Under Utah law, when a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment 
and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials, the trial court may 
properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Franklin Fin, v. New 
Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transf. Co.. 695 
P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 
1987). Therefore, even if the issue of intent had been raised before the Trial Court and the 
contract interpreted as requiring the ongoing consent of the Appellant, the undisputed facts 
allowed the Trial Court to conclude that the Appellant knew of the continuing procedure and 
that Appellant's consent had not been withdrawn before conception. 
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V. 
APPELLEE DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH. 
A. THE ISSUE OF BAD FAITH HAS NOT BEEN PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
As with the issues of intent and contract interpretation, the Appellant failed to raise 
this issue in his Motion for Summary Judgment. As set forth above, the District Court has 
not had the opportunity to rule on the issue as is required to preserve an issue for appeal. 
Therefore, Appellant's argument on this issue of good faith should not be considered. 
B. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF BAD FAITH. 
Even if the Appellant had preserved this issue for appeal, Appellant has failed to 
introduce any evidence that Appellant has not acted in good faith. In the State of Utah a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships. 
St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). 
Appellant argues that the Appellee has breached this covenant by "withholding 
knowledge of her continued attempts to become pregnant," thereby depriving him of his 
voluntary participation in the pregnancy. (Appellant's Brief p21). As discussed above in 
paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Appellant has granted express consent and there is no 
explicit contractual basis for requiring his ongoing consent to be obtained by the Appellee. 
Appellant now attempts to create that duty by arguing that the covenant of good faith 
imposes it. As discussed in Part III, the undisputed facts show that at the time the Appellee 
was continuing the artificial insemination process after the parties had separated, she 
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believed that Appellant knew that she was continuing with the procedure and that her 
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Although Appellant claims to the contrary 
in both his Appellant's Brief and Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, he has not cited any affidavit or deposition testimony supporting that 
claim. Absent testimony to the contrary, Appellant cannot rely upon mere allegations of 
ignorance to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Even if Appellant had submitted contradictory testimony or even undisputed evidence 
that he lacked any knowledge about the continued treatments, that fact alone would not 
create a genuine issue of material fact concerning Appellee's alleged breach of the covenant 
of good faith. The Utah Supreme Court in St. Benedict's explained what that covenant of 
good faith requires. They held: 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party 
impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do 
anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to 
receive the fruits of the contract, [citations omitted] 
A violation of the covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of 
contract. 
Id at 199). 
The propriety of claiming a breach of contract as an affirmative defense to a paternity 
action is not clear. Nevertheless, Appellant's argument does not allege that Appellee has 
prevented him from enjoying the fruits of the contract. The fruit of this contract is not 
Appellant's consent, it is the successful pregnancy and birth of a child. Therefore, by 
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continuing with the treatment, Appellee took the steps necessary to permit the parties to 
receive the ultimate object of the Contract. 
VI. 
THE APPELLEE DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY CONDUCT 
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA OR WAIVER. 
The Appellant has attached a copy of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
divorce decree entered into between the parties in February, 1992 as Addenda 8 and 9 to the 
Appellant's brief. Those documents do not discuss the parties' minor child Matthew 
Krambule. It is clear that the Appellant knew that a child had been born to the Appellee by 
reason of the artificial insemination prior to the entry of the divorce decree. However, the 
Appellant's attorney, Robert F. Neeley, in drafting the documents made no reference to that 
child and did not include a finding that Matthew was not the child of the Appellant. The 
Appellant attempts to establish this by attaching to his brief as Addendum 7, a minute entry 
from a default hearing. The last sentence in the second paragraph of that minute entry states, 
"There is a child expected by the Defendant, but the child is not the Plaintiffs". As 
indicated in the minute entry, this was a default hearing and neither the Appellee nor her 
attorney were present on that occasion. If the court made such a conclusion, it had to be 
based upon the representations of the Appellant since that information was not contained in 
the stipulation, which the court ordered to be incorporated into the findings, conclusions and 
divorce decree. The hearing on February 10,1992 was not a default divorce as stated in the 
-21-
minute entry. Rather, the divorce was entered based upon the stipulation of the parties and 
not upon the default of the Appellee. Consequently, the trial court had no authority to enter 
any findings of fact that were inconsistent with the stipulation that had been agreed upon by 
the parties. This is evident from the fact that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
divorce decree do not contain the language stating that the Appellant was not the father of 
the child Matthew. The stipulation and property settlement agreement is attached as 
Addendum 6 to the Appellee's brief. Paragraph 1 of the stipulation states, "That Plaintiff 
may have his hearing to obtain a mutual divorce in said action at any time without further 
notice to the Defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this stipulation and 
agreement." The Appellee did not agree to withdraw her answer and to allow a default to 
be entered in this case. Instead, the parties agreed that a divorce could be granted based 
upon the terms and conditions of the stipulation. The stipulation makes no reference to the 
child Matthew. In addition, the stipulation does not state that one child has been born to the 
parties. That language was place in the findings by the Appellant's attorney. However, it 
was not justified since the language of the stipulation contains no such statement. 
At the time of the motion for summary judgment, the Appellant did not claim that the 
statement in the minute entry by Judge Allphin constituted an estoppel, res judicata or 
waiver. The court should not now consider those arguments in reviewing the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling. 
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VII. 
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS PRECLUDE ANY ACT 
BY THE PARTIES TO DEFEAT THE MINOR CHILD'S RIGHT OF 
PATERNITY AND TO SUPPORT. 
Strong public policy expressions of concern for the paternity and the support of minor 
children have long been a part of Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court emphasized this 
public policy issue in Gullev v. Gullev. 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). In Gullev, the father 
agreed to pay and the wife agreed to accept $ 10,000 as prepayment for all obligations under 
the Divorce Decree. The State of Utah then sought to collect child support from the father 
irrespective of the agreement. In ruling for the State, the Court succinctly stated: 
Every parent has the duty to support the children he has brought 
into the world. This duty is inalienable and he cannot rid 
himself of it by purporting to transfer it to someone else, by 
contract or otherwise. Moreover, the minor children who are 
the beneficiaries of this duty were not parties to the agreement 
and they could not be bound thereby. 
Gullev v. Gullev, 570 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has directly addressed the doctrine of estoppel in the 
context of child support in Department of Human Services v. Irizarry, 943 P.2d 676 (Utah 
1997). The Irizarrv Court upheld the application of estoppel to prevent a parent from 
seeking reimbursement but explicitly rejected its application to ongoing child support. The 
reason for this distinction rested primarily upon the policy considerations regarding the need 
of children to support from two parents and the fact that ongoing child support belongs to 
the minor child, not the parent. The Court held: 
-23-
We begin by noting that no statement of rejection on Parker's 
part, no matter how strong, could have legally defeated the 
children's right to support. Utah's child support laws and the 
guidelines that accompany them are designed to maximize 
support to children from both of their parents, [citations 
omitted] We emphasized in Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 
(Utah 1981), that the right of the minor children to support 
cannot be 'bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in anyway 
defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parties' [citation 
omitted]. 
Id. at 679 (emphasis added). 
The Court went on to explain that reimbursement is distinct from ongoing child 
support since ongoing child support must be available to supply current needs while 
reimbursement cannot alter the level of support already received by the child. The Court 
recognized that there is no legal requirement for those payments subsequently made by the 
parent to go to the child. Id. at 680. 
Appellant gives no basis for overruling Irizarry and applying the doctrine of estoppel 
beyond the date he was given notice of the Petition except by attempting to seperate the 
issues of the determination of paternity from the obligations of a parent. By arguing that 
Appellee should be equitably estopped from pursuing this claim of paternity, Appellee 
argues for a result that will have the same effect on the minor child, namely, no support from 
one of the parents of the child. This permits the Appellant to attempt to apply the doctrines 
of estoppel, res judicata and waiver to prevent the application of the support clause in the 
artificial insemination contract. As will be discussed below, each of these doctrines is not 
applicable to defeat his obligations for the minor child. 
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A. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
At trial, the District Court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did apply 
to exclude any amounts of past due child support or reimbursement for all periods prior to 
the month following the filing of the present Petition. (R. at 406-7). The District Court's 
ruling on this issue can be found in the Conclusions of Law which state: 
The Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible for 
paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statue 
limits the period to four (4) years prior to the determination of 
paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past 
child support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if 
applicable. In this matter, the Court finds that Respondent's 
conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce 
proceedings, is sufficient to disallow payment for back child 
support beyond the date she filed for a determination of 
Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable 
Estoppel. 
Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 3(b). 
Factually, the Appellant has failed to supply any evidence to support equitable 
estoppel. Irrespective of the lack of evidence, as a legal matter, this Court should uphold the 
policy considerations discussed above and refuse to apply this doctrine to defeat the minor 
child's right to ongoing child support. 
These policy considerations should also apply to the determination of paternity. Acts 
of a parent should not defeat a child's right to two parents. 
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B. RES JUDICATA 
Based upon that same analysis and policy considerations, res judicata should not act 
to defeat the obligations of a parent to their child. Appellant argues that since Matthew's 
paternity was not litigated in the initial divorce proceeding, this present attempt at 
establishing paternity should be barred by claim preclusion. Claim preclusion is a branch 
of res judicata and requires that all the claims of the parties that could have and should have 
been litigated in a prior action are barred in any subsequent actions. Estate of Covington v. 
Josephson. 888 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1994). 
The very language quoted in Irizarry forecloses the use of any legal or equitable 
doctrine from defeating a claim for ongoing child support. The Court in Irizarry 
affirmatively quoted the Court in Hills v. Hills. 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981). The Hills 
Court stated: "the right of the minor children to support cannot be "bartered away, 
extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parties". 
The literal application of this language would bar the application of res judicata, as well 
estoppel, since both are based upon the conduct or agreement of the parties. 
Even if the Court were to apply res judicata, Appellant has failed to meet its elements. 
There are two branches in res judicata, claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. Dept. of 
Social Services v. Ruscetta. 742 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1987). Collateral estoppel is not 
applicable because it only bars issues raised in subsequent litigation that were decided in the 
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first. Id at 116. However, to be applied, the issue in question must be "fully and fairly 
litigated" in the prior litigation. Id. 
The parentage of Matthew Krambule was never even raised let alone litigated in the 
stipulated divorce. As discussed above, the minute entry falsely identified the proceeding 
as a default judgment and the testimony of the Appellant did not correspond to the 
agreements in the Stipulation. 
The other branch of res judicata, collateral estoppel, operates to bar a second claim 
between the same party or their privies concerning the same claim or cause of action which 
were actually litigated or should have been litigated in the prior action. IdL_ As with issue 
preclusion, there was no litigation or determination of Matthew's parentage in the initial 
divorce proceedings. Nor could it have been brought. Absent the consent of the father, the 
time for a trial shall not be held before the birth of the child. § 78-45a-6, Utah Code 
Annotated. At the time the Stipulation was signed and the hearing on the divorce held, 
Matthew had not yet been born and no consent had been obtained to proceed. Matthew was 
born on March 24, 1992, nearly three months after stipulation was signed and the divorce 
was heard. 
CL WAIVER. 
As discussed above, Irizarry preludes the use of any legal or equitable doctrine to 
prevent the collection of ongoing child support since it would permit the actions of one of 
the parties to preclude the collection of ongoing child support from a party otherwise legally 
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responsible for the child. On the same basis, waiver should be used to preclude the 
operation of this contract to defeat the Appellant's obligations for the minor child. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990) rejected 
the application of contractual theories to defeat an increase in child support. In Gates, the 
appellant filed an appeal of a modified divorce decree increasing his child support to reflect 
his most recent pay raise. Over two years earlier, the parties had stipulated to increase child 
support gradually based upon a modest estimates of the father's earnings growth in the 
future. When the custodial parent learned of the actual income of the father, she filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree while the Appellant sought to enforce the stipulation. 
The Court rejected the stipulation and held: 
In Meyers, this court noted that while contract theories such as 
bargain and waiver are properly applied to a stipulation as to 
property distribution, such theories are inapplicable to issues 
which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the court, 
such as child custody and support. 
IdLatl346. 
Just as in Gates, the Appellant seeks to apply the contract theory of waiver to the 
issue of his obligations. This Court should reject its application on the basis that it cannot 
trump the equitable powers of the court in determining paternity and in setting and enforcing 
child support obligations. 
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VIII. 
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL. 
At trial the District Court awarded $5,803.13 to Appellee for attorney's fees and 
costs. Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce are awarded below to the party who then prevails 
on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489,494 
(Utah App. 1991) citing Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990). Therefore, 
if Appellee prevails in this appeal, she should be awarded attorney's fees and costs as 
determined by the District Court on remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues of intent, contract interpretation and bad faith were not preserved for 
appeal and should not be considered. Furthermore, public policy concerns regarding the 
support of minor children preclude the application of estoppel, res judicata and waiver. The 
District Court correctly ruled that the artificial insemination contract bound the Appellee to 
be legally responsible for the minor child born as a result of this procedure despite the fact 
that the parties were separated at the time of conception. Finally, if Appellee prevails on this 
appeal, she should be awarded her attorney's fees as determined on remand. 
The trial court's order on the parties Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and its 
subsequent modification of the Decree of Divorce should be upheld and 
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the issue of attorney's fees and costs on appeal be remanded to the District Court. 
DATED this £%_ day of May, 1999. 
ROBERT A ECHARD 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee to Robert L. Neeley, attorney for Appellant Ricky D. Krambule at 2485 Grant Ave, 
Suite 200, Ogden, Utah, 84401. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 1 
£ \ .->\X 0> 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 
AND 
DIVISION OF UROLOGY 
CONSENT TO PERFORM PROCEDURES TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY 
THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF DONOR SEMEN 
1. We, as husband and wife, acknowledge that we have been 
unable to achieve a pregnancy because of one or more of the 
following conditions? notwithstanding thorough evaluation and 
therapy: 
(A) Abnormality of the semen, including reduced 
numbers, and/or quality or absence of sperm; 
<B) Cervical disease, including immobilization of the 
sperm; 
(C) Endometriosis; 
(D) Other causes including unexplained infertility; 
<E) Or have genetic problems. 
2. Ule hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and 
request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in an 
attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with semen obtained from 
an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s). 
(A) In order to facilitate the success of this 
procedure, we agree to follow procedures and 
complete documentation as outlined by the 
Department of Obstetrics and/or the Division of 
Urology of the University of Utah School of 
Medicine. 
3. Ule are aware, on the basis of present information, the 
chances that a pregnancy will be achieved by the artificial 
insemination procedure(s) are ^0-7S% through six cycles, and 
acknowledge that no representations or guarantees, express or 
implied, have been made to us with respect to whether the 
procedure(s) will be successful. 
**. Ule have been fully informed of all known significant 
and substantial risks incident to artificial insemination, 
whether fresh or frozen semen is used, which include: 
1 
(A) Bleeding and/or infection; 
(B) Pain associated with the various procedures; 
(C) Discomfort and complictions connected with 
pregnancyj childbirth and delivery;. 
(D) Birth of an infant or infants suffering from any 
birth defect(s), or of abnormalities of any kind, 
including but not limited to infection(s) or 
disease(s) transmitted through donor semen; 
(E) Uncertainty of genetic, hereditary traits or 
tendencies of such offspring; 
(F) Other adverse consequences of any kind* which are 
unknown but may arise or be connected directly or 
indirectly to the artificial insemination and/or 
procedure(s). 
5. We acknowledge that if pregnancy is achieved there is 
no assurance of a live or healthy birth, or of a normal genetic 
contribution from the donor's sperm, and that in any event, all 
pregnancies face a 3-*f% risk of some birth defect. 
6. We have been offered the option of carrier testing or 
chromosome testing of the donor if there is a history of 
autosomal recessive trait or a heritable chromosomal 
translocation in the wife. 
7. We have had an unlimited opportunity to ask questions 
about the procedure(s) and the risks involved, and our questions 
have been fully answered to our satisfaction. 
S. We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial 
insemination procedure(s) is voluntary. 
9. In order to artificially inseminate the wife, the 
doctor hereafter identified shall obtain the necessary semen from 
a third party donor, selected by the doctor. The donor shall not 
at any time be advised of the identity of the wife, nor of the 
success or failure of the insemination. The undersigned, and 
each of them, agree that the identity of the donor shall not be 
divulged to them or any offspring resulting from such 
insemination for any reason by the doctor, except upon the 
issuance of a duly authorized order of court of competent 
jurisdiction, the issuance of which shall not be sought by the 
undersigned. The doctor shall require the donor to agree in 
writing not to seek out the identity of the undersigned. 
2 
10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept 
the full legal, moral, parental, financial, social, emotional and 
cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may result 
from any pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination 
procedure(s). We also mutually and individually agree to accept 
and assume the same duties, obligations and responsibilities 
toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as 
owed by the undersigned to naturally occurring offspring, and 
acknowledge and agree that any offspring resulting from the 
artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heir(s) 
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child 
of the husband and wife, and the husband shall for all purposes 
be considered the father of the said offspring. 
11. The doctor in consultation with husband and wife may 
use fresh or frozen semen from one or more unidentified donors, 
to select the donor(s), including the laboratory which has 
collected, processed and stored the semen. It is understood that 
risk factors set forth in paragraph A-(A) , (C), & (D) are greater 
where fresh sperm is used, but we accept those risks. 
IS. We hereby covenant and agree, without reservation of 
right, in law or equity, to indemnify, hold harmless and release 
the doctor, the persons who are the donors of the semen, those 
persons who collect, store, and/or preserve and manipulate the 
semen specimens, the University of Utah, the university of Utah 
Hospital, the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the 
Division of Urology, their officers, employees and agents from 
any and all liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, in 
any manner connected with or related to: 
(A) Complications of pregnancy; 
<B) Complications in any manner connected with child 
birth and/or delivery; 
(C) Birth of any infant or infants suffering from any 
birth defect, or of abnormalities of any kind, 
including but not limited to infections or 
transmitted diseased through donor semen; 
(D) Genetic, hereditary traits or tendencies of such 
offspring; 
(E) Any other adverse consequences of any kind that 
may arise or be connected directly or indirectly 
to or in any manner with offspring resulting from 
the artificial insemination and/or procedure(s) 
herein authorized or contemplated. 
13. We agree, individually and severally, that neither of 
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in 
3 
any way, any person, including any child or offspring in 
initiating or pursuing any claim or legal proceeding with respect 
to any matter arising out of, or resulting from the artificial 
insemination procedure(s) authorized herein. 
1^. We agree and acknowledge that the procedures(s) 
authorized herein shall be considered for all purposes, medical 
services. 
15. With the above considerations in mind, we, individually 
and as husband and wife, hereby consent to, request and authorize 
Dr. \ V < "A , who is herein referred to as "our 
d o c t o r , " a n d s u c h a s s i s t a n t s and associates as our doctor may 
designate, t/o undertake one or more artificial insemination 
procedures in an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife, 
understanding and accepting all the risks and responsibilities 
attendant thereto. 
16. Confident iali tv. We understand that our doctor, the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology 
and the University of Utah, will consider the information 
developed about us during this treatment as confidential, and 
that neither our identity nor specific medical details will be 
revealed by any of them without our prior consent; however, 
specific medical details may be revealed in professional 
publications, but our identify is not to be revealed. We 
understand that in the event an authorized government agency 
reviews this or other documents, they may learn of our identity. 
17. Procedures Authorized to Treat Unforeseen Conditions. 
We recognize that during the course of any of the procedures 
outlined above, unforeseen conditions may necessitate additional 
or different procedures than those set forth above. In the event 
we authorize and request our doctor, his assistants or his 
designees, to perform such procedures as are in the exercise of 
professional judgment necessary and desirable. 
18. We acknowledge that the University of Utah, the 
University of Utah School of Medicine, the Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology, and all 
officers and employees, including our doctor, are subject to the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-
.It et seq., U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which Act controls all 
procedures and limitations with respect to claims of liability. 
19. Consent Agreement Binding Upon the Heirs. This Consent 
Agreement shall be binding upon our administrators and heirs. 
<+ 
20. Signatures. We acknowledge by our signatures below 
that we have read the foregoing and that all questions pertaining 
thereto have been answered to our satisfaction. 
UNDERSIGNED: 
WITNESS: 
W i f e : T 
Da te : I 
Husband 
Da te : 
-*y-^W 
<=< • V 
: n^ 
r u 7 ^ -> 








- > ; : ^ ' _ 
/ <; " ^ 
SIGNATURE OF DOCTOR PROVIDING 
THE ABOVE INFORMATJ 
)  I ] 
"JJDN: 





I i EXHIBIT 
7" 
-^v-.tL-^—^»^_cUv-iL_c-_TL _i=>_J^ ==r_ 
-7 
X j ^ _; 2fc.-~ i.Co^ -rX^L U^ 
J k ^ J^^/J^wriei^_L^>~--.-.-
(Q( ^ 2blA L I ^ _ N ^ 1 . i t ^ ^ L * -£»J^ -
JJ s^=s=A 
'7' 
l , o^.v. ^ 
. ^ ^ .X 
:_*—X ^ ^ N ^ :>w— -f-L-^i- j L ^ , C~1(<-Q)^ ^J^L,. 
-7-




- " " /S-~ 1 €-~J> C^> i < j O 1 
e^^4 
/ »1^ £Jt~ 
\ - .^-r-d-.> 5>^ _« Jjb-fJ+-tl) f'ja.lA<r-j .J <, w y c^  C^ -a-s I
 / 4.. ~ A 
„ _ D *~*~~ & v-— 
_C^_L 
-1 >*— *-» »— - \ * • r ^ < _ «_jCr^ -.-.. ^j-cr^.. - I — 
-(-^ T.^ ciu^__ : 
< . c^C^-* 
?i<_w<e^ /.^.J!L_i-<~^*^-. * i . J^t^JV^L_.w~/*. 
- / i * J ^ _ < ^ -c^JLlf^dJ^^ 
.Xh it ui*—tc-\ . ~ (P «-?..* / 1 ^ L V . . T : ^ . ^ < ^ • > T l . „ . o ^ r . y *— «-~ r>-
^ . - r . - ^ J . . 
.( £<* ^ i ^ 1 . 1 . 1 tf */jw% .^Lj V^JS 
_Ua.-=> **—*£* ^ ^  _^I^__^...^L_._btt^ L—.-ikJLJL. 
iL J_ ,_-,^ j£_^ ^^rli-i , i _S^se^L 
->"' o>- +<— 
«VNL^K=X n "7^— J ^ L >^y* ^ — - X c_*L f^~—\j» «-- A A//< 
^ 6 ^ 1 / . X^=^-J^-3=--r(*-.« C . _ ^ 3 ^ _ U * A . * « - / 3 /• ^ ** — ^ U ^ r j -
o v->*-*. c p ^ . 
-7*-—" 
It couldn't hurt to read this: 
It won't take that long. Don't throw it away. 
And just so you don't get to the end of this and say, "you should have thought 
about that." I know I should have. Believe me. 
What I'd like you to think about is whether over the last year and a half, I've acted 
like someone who wasn't happy with his life, and went out "looking" for someone else? 
This is why I keep reminding you that she called me. (Yes, I know I should have hung 
up.) 
In the last year and a half, we've planned for a new house, vacations, babies, 
furniture, drapes, you name it. We've talked about how to deal with the loss of your job, 
Steph's problems in school, and on and. We've gone out more, camped more, and had 
more fun than we had in five years put together. 
This wasnot all some elaborate scheme to deceive you, it was how I really felt, 
^and howlstill doTjThe reality of it is that everything really happened. It's all been true. 
And then I screwed up. 
Look at it all together, and put it in perspective. It was a moment of weakness vs 
a year and a half or trying hard at happiness. 
The alternative is ????. There's no way you're going to go to school full time, 
because my income alone won't support two households. We might even be talking stuff 
like whether S§££ can go to college or not. And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how 
that's going to work. Think about it. " " • ^ 
One of your few faults is that you're too tough. We've talked about it and its 
probably from your childhood, but you feel that if you soften up and compromise a little, 
you're being weak. (You were soft on Thursday night, and I think you had a better 
handle on this whole thing then you've had since) Understanding and sympathy are not 
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December 3, 1991 
Attorney Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
RE; Krambule vs. Krambule 
My File No. 400-11909-V 
Dear Robert: 
In connection with the above matter, my client has 
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated 
at great lengths whether she should or should not pursue 
and has finally decided she's going to pursue it. 
Your client and my client agreed to artificial insem-
ination so that the parties could have another child. 
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted 
and as a result my client is pregnant and expecting a 
child. 
She is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant 
and since he agreed to the artificial insemination and 
she's going to obtain for me his written consent, the 
child is his and I've tried this before where the Court 
has acknowledged these types of agreements. 
My client has indicated that if he will not put up 
a fuss over this child, pay the child support in accordance 
with the schedule for the children, then she would give up 
any claim she has to alimony. 
In addition, she indicated that she would allow 
overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school 
is not in session, which would include holidays and summer 
vacation. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: Darwin Hanson 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin 
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment, 
the court having reviewed materials submined by counsel and having heard argument from the 
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, the court makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court does not have the evidentiary information necessary to make a 
determination as to the amount of child support, medical expenses and other financial 
determinations that have been raised by the parties in their pleadings. 
ROBERT ECHARD 
& ASSOCIATES-
L A W OFFICES 
*TY BANK BUILDING. SUITE 200 I 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD | 
OGDEN. UTAH W401 
(801) J9J-2JOO 
FAX (801) J9J-2J40 
2. The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment 
and will rule solely in the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the minor child 
in question. 
3. The Plaintiff is not the biological father of the minor child. 
4. In modern society, birth is possible by artificial insemination other means. 
Consequently, the court must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine 
the legal obligations of the parties engaged in that type of conception. 
5. The court finds that on July 18, 1990 the parties entered into a contract 
entitled, "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination 
of Donor Sperm". The court finds that this contract obligated the Plaintiff and the Defendant to 
assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial insemination. This 
legal duty included all of the rights of a minor child of natural parents. 
6. The court finds that this was the second contract the parties had entered into 
of this nature and that a child was produced from the first contract for which both parties have 
assume the full rights as natural parents. 
7. The court finds that in order for this contract to be null and void, an event 
must occur which would terminate the contract. The court does not rule on all the events that could 
terminate such a contract, however, in this case the court rules that a divorce could have terminated 
the contract. The court finds that in this case the child was conceived during the marriage and bom 
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8. The court finds there is a strong public policy to protect the interest of a 
minor child. A separation of the parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and the court 
finds that only a divorce obtained prior to the conception of the child would be sufficient to 
repudiate the contract in this case. 
9. The court finds that the Plaintiff is legally the father of the minor child, 
Matthew, who was born on March 24, 1992. 
10. The Plaintiff has all of the obligations and rights associated with being the 
natural parent of Matthew. 
11. The remaining issues that have not been resolved shall be set for a trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
( 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a legally binding contract for 
artificial insemination. 
2. The contract was not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this 
case could only be repudiated by a divorce which occurred prior to the conception of the child. 
3. The child in this case, Matthew, was conceived and born prior to the divorce 
of the parties. 
4. The contract is binding between the parties and imposes on both parties the 
legal responsibilities of natural parents to the child. 
5. The court rules that the Plaintiff has the same legal responsibilities and rights 
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6. The remaining issues that have been unresolved shall be set for an 
evidentiary trial. 
DATED t h i s ^ £ day of March, 1998. 
DARWIN HANSON 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit 
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this^C day of March, 1998. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
documents), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge:"lXoU \\^„ 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin 
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment, 
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the 
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The court grants the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 
2. The Plaintiff has all the legal obligations and rights of a natural parent in 
regard to Matthew Krambule, born on March 24, 1992. 




>4& DATED this^T^day of March, 1998. 
HA: 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit 
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
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 ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
documents), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
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OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3 64 6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, ] 
Plaintiff , 
vs. ' 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
) STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
) Judge: 
) Civil No. U07W7J 
WHEREAS, the plaintiff above named has commenced an 
action for divorce in the above-entitled Court; and 
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating and 
agreeing at this time with respect to the issues raised by said 
action, NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the 
parties hereto as follows, to-wit: 
1. That plaintiff may have his hearing to obtain a 
mutual divorce in said action at any time without further notice to 
defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation 
and Agreement. 
2. That defendant is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date of 
birth January 29, 1985. 
STIPULATION 
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE 
Civil No. 910750473 
3. That plaintiff shall be granetd the standard 
visitation rights as utilized by the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the 
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each 
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that 
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider 
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the 
time stated above. 
4. That defendant shall maintain the parties1 minor 
child on her health and accident insurance with Hill Air Force 
Base. Each party shall pay one-half the non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for benefit of the parties1 minor child 
and incorporate The Standard Medical Provisions adopted by the 
above-entitled Court herein. The Standard Medical Provisions is 
attached hereto and by reference made a part of this Stipulation. 
In the event defendant does not have available to her at her place 
of employment a medical and health plan, plaintiff shall obtain a 
medical and health plan for benefit of the parties' minor child 
through his employment. 
5. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$326.00 per month as and for child support based upon his gross 
annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year through Alpine Paving & 
Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of 
STIPULATION 
KRAMBULE VS• KRAMBULE 
Civil No, 910750473 
$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base. 
6. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not to exceed 
four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates from 
Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, alimony 
shall terminate by operation of law, i.e. cohabitation or 
remarr iage. 
7. That plaintiff shall pay one-half (1/2) of the day 
care expense incurred for benefit of the parties' minor child and 
defendant shall provide written documentation of the monthly child 
care expense. 
8. Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant 
may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is 
pursuing a bachelor's degree. Defendant is approximately a 
sophomore in college and plaintiff's obligation to pay for her 
books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1, 
1991. 
9. That the family home and real property located at 703 
W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah has been sold and each party has 
received one-half the net sales proceeds, and if there are any 
additional payments received for payment of the reserve account, 
each party shall also divide the same equally. 
10. That defendant shall be awarded the 1987 Jeep 
STIPULATION 
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE 
Civil No. 910750473 
Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and 
one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home. 
11. That defendant shall be awarded his IRA, his 
retirement, his interest in Alpine Paving, Inc., his camping 
equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net 
sale proceeds from the sale of the home. 
12. The parties shall divide equally the joint account 
at Shearson Leheman. 
13. That defendant shall be paid $7,825.00 on or before 
January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior 
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc. 
14. That the parties have equitably divided the 
household furniture and furnishings and personal effects, and 
neither party makes any claim upon the other for any item of 
personal property. 
15. That plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance 
policy in the sum of $50,000.00 and defendant shall maintain a life 
insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and each party shall designate 
their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as beneficiary thereto and 
each shall maintain said child as beneficiary until she reaches at 
least 18 years of age. 
16. That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties1 
minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of 
op* 
STIPULATION 
KRAMBULE VS• KRAMBULE 
Civil No. 910750473 
computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current 
on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may 
incur by reason of not being allowed to claim said child as a 
dependent for tax purposes. Plaintiff shall pay defendant in cash 
for any loss she may incur prior to defendant signing any forms 
necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties1 child as a dependent 
for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish plaintiff all necessary tax 
information no later than February 28 of each year and plaintiff to 
advise defendant no later than March 30 of each year as to his 
election whether to claim the parties1 child as a dependent for tax 
purposes. 
17. That each party shall pay their own attorney fees 
and cost of Court incurred in these proceedings. 
18. That each party shall pay one-half of any non-
covered medical expense incurred during the course of the marriage 
and each party shall be responsible to pay any debts and 
obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation 
on or about May 3, 1991. 
19. That plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all 
business debts incurred in connection with Alpine Paving, Inc. and 
shall hold defendant harmless thereon. 
20. In the event defendant decides to move from the 
immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to 
STIPULATION 
KR&MBULE VS. KRAMBULE 
Civil No. 910750473 
relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of 
forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving. 
DATED this ](? day of Q ^ w ^ j - y , 199SL. 
IICKY D. KfcAMBULE 
Plaintiff 
IT L. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 




Attorney for Defendant 
^ 
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IN THE SECC JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURf F DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMISSIONER'S VISITATION GUIDELINES 
Reasonable visitation should be defined as the parents may 
agree. If they are not able to agree, reasonable/standard visitation 
will routinely be defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten) 
children as follows: 
1. Alternate weekends: Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m. 
2. Midweek: Alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
3. Holidays: 
(A) CHRISTMAS - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas Day beginning at 1 p.m. and continuing through one-half 
of the child's total Christmas school vacation. 
(B) THANKSGIVING & EASTER - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 96, eta.J; 
Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m. 
Non-custodial parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 9P 
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m. 
(C) OTHER HOLIDAYS - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, and 
Labor Day. These holidays are to be alternated, with the 
non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and 
no changes should be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend schedule. 
4. Father's Day/Mother's Day: 
As appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6 p.m. 
the day of. 
5. Birthdays; 
One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the week 
of the child's birthday and the non-custodial parent's birthday. 
6. Extended Visitation: 
(A) SUMMER - Four weeks continuous, with written notice of 
dates provided to custodial parent by May First. Custodial 
parent to have alternate weekends, holiday, and phone 
visitation. 
(B) YEAR-ROUND SCHOOL - Two two-week periods, with wr.il» 
notice of dates to custodial parent at least 30 days prio; 
visitation. Custodial parent to have holiday, and phone 
visitation during this time. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year 
uninterrupted time with the children for purposes of vacation; 
provided the same does not interfere with holiday visitation 
per above. Each parent shall notify the other in writing of 
such two-week period at least 3 0 days in advance. 
7. Telephone: - Reasonable visitation before 8 p.m. 
8. Other times as agreed by the parties, A 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STANDARD MEDICAL PROVISIONS 
[Plaintiff] [Defendant] [is] [are] ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for 
the benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in 
existence as of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's current 
or subsequent place of employment (Plaintiff's - Defendant's) is to be primary insurance. Each parent 
is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible or non covered amounts for such essential medical or 
dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to 
provide other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to insure the prompt 
payment of the insured portion of such claims and notify other party of insurance claims as paid. The 
custodial parent is to pay routine office calls. 
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for orthodontia work or elective 
surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating 
co-payment from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in writing. The 
non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and 
procedures for any and all orthodontia, or surgery procedures, or pschological counseling, for which he 
or she is expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, and written 
consent, then the obligating parent shall have the primae facie obligation to pay any non insurance 
covered expense. 
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than emergency), medical, orthodontic 
or pschological counseling be done as a co-obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the 
court. The party found to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs and attorney fees. 
For procedures not covered by the insurance but reasonably within the parties ability to pay 
and necessary to the welfare of the child, such as orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then 
each party will normally be ordered to pay one-half of the costs associated with such treatments or 
procedures. 
When the other parent is expected to be responsible for deductible amounts attributable to 
medical or dental expenses incurred for the parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide 
copies of all receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any billing 
therefore incurrea. Any claims not maae to the other parent within that time frame in writing will be 
primae facie deemea waived. The other party is ordered to make their portion of those payments, or 
make arrangements to do so within 45 days of receipt of the documentation supporting required 
parti cipat ion. 
The party who has the health and accident insurance is ordered to maintain it for the benefit 
of the family until such time as the Decree in this matter is final and to make continued coverage 
available to the spouse under "COBRA"; provided however the spouse taking advantage of said coverage 
shall pay the cost thereof unless otherwise ordered by the Court. .
 s 
Commissioner, Weber) 
County District Court 
(When applicable the standard should be typed into your findings and decree or a typed 
insertion of it shall be attached to the order or decree; not merely referenced) 
-T\"\ecJ or\ \-<31-92-
IN THE SECOND 
DAVIS 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY 
Civil No. 9 1 0 7 5 0 4 7 3 
L Enter the combined number of natural and adopted children of this mother 
and father. 
2a- Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. 
Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). * 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations 
ordered for the children in this case). 
2d Optional: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home 
Worksheet for either parent, 
3- Subtract Linc2bf 2c, and 2d from 2a- This is the Adjusted Mondily 
Gross for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in line 3 and the number of children in line 
1 to the Support Table. Fmd the Base Combined Support Obligation. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in line 3 by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross in l ine 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parents share of 
the Base Support Obligation. 
7. Enter the children's portion of monthly medical and dental insurance 
premiums paid to insurance company, 
8. Enter the raonthlywotk or training related child care expense for the 
thechildren in Line L 
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor parent. 
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award 
Subtract the Obligor's line 7 from line 9. 
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child 
Divide Line 10 by Line 1. 
11 CHILD CARE AWARD 
Multiply Line 8 by JO to obtain obligor's share of child care expense. Add to Line 10 only 
when expense is actually incurred. 
-o 
